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1"Stanley: Most mighty sovereign,
You have no cause to hold my friendship doubtful.
I never was nor never will be false.
King Richard: Go then and muster men. But leave behind
Your son, George Stanley. Look your heart be ﬁrm,
Or else his head’s assurance is but frail.”
- William Shakespeare, "Richard III", Act 4, Scene 4
“The best way to understand the way Stalin worked is to ...
re-read Shakespeare’s Richard III.”
- S.E.Finer, "The History of Government from the Earliest Time"
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Dictatorship is one of the oldest forms of government (see Tullock, 1987, Olson, 1993, Bueno
de Mesquita et al., 2003).1 Human history is replete with examples of unconstrained rulers, often
exhibiting strikingly poor governance. Despite the enormous success of democracies on every count,
there is no sure sign that dictatorship is vanishing as a form of governance today. While the number
of democratic countries increased signiﬁcantly during the last decades of the 20th century, there
is also a signiﬁcant number of emerging dictatorships, especially in countries of the former Soviet
Union such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus.
In this paper, we do not study why dictatorships emerge.2 Instead, we focus on the internal
structure of dictatorships.3 When an autocrat faces threats from both inside and outside his
country, one limit on his power is the incompetence of his ministers and advisors. While incompetent
ministers are not completely unusual in democratic countries, most historians and political scientists
would agree that dictatorships are especially marred by incompetence.4 Most recently, Saddam
1For an overview of the state of the art in the formal work on dictatorship see Wintrobe (2002). Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Acemoglu (2003) and Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier
(2004), Galliego and Pitchik (2004) suggest dynamic frameworks for studying modern dictatorships. Recent empirical
studies of dictatorships include Epstein et al. (2004), Przeworski et al. (2000), Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Linz
and Chehabi, eds., (1998) and Wantchekon (2000). Domínguez (2002) lists traits that are likely to be exposed by
politically eﬀective military dictatorships.
2For emergence of modern dictatorships, see a collection of case-studies in Linz and Stepan (1978). Acemoglu and
Robinson (2005) analyze how the unability of elites and masses to commit to future actions leads to emergence of
dictatorships.
3Following Tullock (1987), we attempt to study ‘autocrats’, i.e. both hereditary rulers and modern dictators, in a
uniﬁed framework.
4One dictator that apparently valued loyalty higher than even basic education was Pol Pot, the leader of the
2Hussein’s failure to maintain a reasonable pre-war strategy and defense (even taking into account
overwhelming American military power) seems in particular to be due to the incompetence of his
closest advisors. The infamous Iraqi information minister Muhammed al-Sahhad (dubbed ‘Comical
Ali’) is only one manifestation of this pattern. Furthermore, even the best of dictators lost the
most competent of their advisors while acquiring more and more power. Since his most unfortunate
military undertaking, the 1812 Russian campaign, Napoleon has been surrounded by his most loyal
marshals, rather than his most competent ones. Stalin, a dictator of a very diﬀerent kind, was
notable for having exclusively mediocrities in his inner court (Gregory, 2004).
Yet the main problem for an autocrat might be not the incompetence, but the possible treach-
ery, of a vizier. As early as in 1965 BC, i.e. almost four thousand years ago, King Sesostris of
Egypt warned future kings in his Instruction: ‘Be on your guard against all subordinates, because
you cannot be sure who is plotting against you’ (Rindova and Starbuck, 1997). Han Fei Tzu, a
Chinese philosopher of the 3rd century BC, advised rulers to distrust subordinates and inspire
fear in them. Wintrobe (2000) notes that ‘the dictator has every reason to suspect that there
are plots against him’ and lists some dictators that have been consumed by paranoia, ‘the most
likely personality characteristics possessed by dictators’: the Roman Emperors Tiberius and Nero,
and modern dictators Stalin and Mao Zedong. Often, dictators’ long tenures witness executions
or at least long imprisonments of their closest subordinates. For example, the text-book history
of European monarchies contains a long list of brilliant ﬁrst ministers executed (for various formal
reasons) by their sovereigns: Thomas More by Henry VII of England, Angerran de Maringhi by
Philippe IV of France, Thomas Wentworth (Straﬀord) by Charles I of England, etc. Modern ex-
amples include executions and imprisonments of close associates of Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, and
Saddam Hussein, not to mention the ‘great purges’ of the Stalin era.
The principal-agent theory, coupled with an appropriate selection model, helps us to explain
simultaneously the incompetence and the treason phenomena.5 One driving force is that a more
competent advisor is more prone to treason: he might be more easily bribed into a plot, etc. The
reason is that a cunning ﬁrst minister acts as a discriminating monopolist for possible enemies of the
crown, while an uninformed ﬁrst minister acts as a normal monopolist. As Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003) put it, ‘The incentive to defect from the incumbent to a challenger depends on the prospects
Khmer Rouge movement in Cambodia, who attempted to execute everyone having higher education or being a public
servant or a teacher upon taking power in 1975 (Kiernan, 2004). The Pol Pot’s regime lasted for three years and
costed Cambodia over 1.7 millions of lifes, more than a ﬁfth of the entire population. (Cook, 2004, Heder and
Tittemore, 2004).
5Proper acknowledgement of the principal-agent theory insights that inﬂuenced this work would have amounted to
a small survey, which is hardly appropriate here. We refer to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) as the most up-to-date
source on the subject.
3of being included into the challenger’s winning coalition if he should replace the incumbent.’6
Assuming that the willingness of the ﬁrst minister to accept a bribe is increasing both in the size
of the bribe and the probability of success of the plot or a foreign invasion, the ruler trades oﬀ the
loyalty of his ﬁrst minister (lower willingness to accept a bribe) and his competence (which imply
higher willingness to accept bribes for treason).
Though deﬁnitely adhering to the main paradigm of the principal-agent theory, we deliberately
abstain from using some standard contract-theory approaches to principal-agent issues. In partic-
ular, we do not model explicitly the situation where the agent betrayed the dictator, the plot is
unsuccessful, but the dictator does not automatically learn that his agent is a traitor. In real-life
situations, the dictator may very well be uncertain whether or not the agent’s inaction prior to the
plot was betrayal or just lack of competence. Any standard contract theory model has something
to say about this situation.7 The main diﬀerences between this model and a standard one are that
the dictator has very limited power to determine the payoﬀs for the agent, both for the case where
the agent is to be rewarded and where he is to be punished; and that all information is ex post
observable by the dictator. Indeed, it might be taken as a deﬁnition of a dictatorship that, once
all the power is allocated to a single authority, all promises are subject to future reevaluation by
this authority.
With a dictator understanding that a better informed advisor is more likely to misinform him,
the incentive for a competent politician to accept a high position in a dictatorial regime diminishes.
In this case it is the threat of execution for treason or another severe punishment that might
deter the most competent people from pursuing their careers. If the dictator is able to commit
to some mild level of punishment (in the presence of the information-vs.-bribe trade-oﬀ that the
advisor faces, capital punishment should be always suboptimal), then this problem can be resolved.
However, in the subgame where the dictator believes that the advisor is a traitor, he has no
incentive not to apply capital punishment. This is one place where democracy has an advantage
over dictatorship: a commitment problem of this kind might be easier to resolve with democratic
institutions in place. The dictator’s inability to commit to the optimal level of punishment is
a particular case of a more general phenomenon: any use of incentive schemes by a dictator is
limited by the fact that rewards and punishments are necessarily conditional upon the dictator’s
6In Gallego and Pitchik (2004), kingmakers, an exogenously given group of suboridnates, choose either to support
the incumbent or otherthrow him weighing costs and beneﬁts of a coup d’etat.
7Many modern dictatorships have been democracies by constitution and held regular, if non-competitive, elections
(e.g., the Philippines under Marcos, Paraguay under Stressner, and almost all socialist states). Thus, delineation of
democracies and dictatorships, though often obvious, is to a large extent a matter of judgement on the researcher’s
part.
4own survival.8
An important class of situations in which the choice of a close associate is critical for a dictator
is where the dictator faces a succession problem (Tullock, 1987, p. 151). Historically, dictators
with a plebeian origin were very rarely able to create a dynasty of their own. Herz (1952) argues
that of the dictators of the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, only a few succeeded in controlling their
succession, one such example being the Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk’s transfer of power to his
designated successor.9 Securing the succession of their chosen successor, dictators face the same
problem that they face while selecting a vizier: the more capable is a potential successor, the more
able he is to overthrow the dictator. This might be the reason why so many undisputed leaders
have been mute on potential succession. To study problems of succession, we investigate our formal
model in a dynamic perspective, where the current choice of the dictator is aﬀected not only by his
own survival prospects, but by those of his successors as well.
When considering dictatorships, the role of case studies of particular regimes cannot be overes-
timated. An excellent study of the structure of Stalin’s regime was carried out by Gregory (2004).
This study is particularly valuable because it used archives that became available only recently, in-
cluding protocols of the Politburo meetings. Analyzing both general patterns and speciﬁce x a m p l e s
of replacement of professionals in armed forces by personal loyalists in Batista’s Cuba, Dominguez
(1998) concludes: ‘It was these unprofessional, politicized oﬃcers who faced Fidel Castro’s insur-
gency and lost.’ This emphasis on loyalty over competence is considered a general trait of sultanistic
regimes (Domínguez, 1998, and other case studies in Linz and Chehabi, 1998). Considering the rule
of Salazar, the Portuguese dictator in the period 1932—1968, Lewis (1978) identiﬁes the problem
of self-selection of subordinates: ‘[Salazar] was ... intolerant of those who did not share [his own
views] to the last degree. That discouraged many talented young men from entering the government
service.’ With Salazar’s power increasingly secure, ‘the patterns of recruitment show the regime
evolving from its military and semi-fascist beginnings in the direction of a modern technocratic
state’ (Lewis, 1978).
In a search for a ‘perfect dictatorship,’ Domínguez (2002) studies the most successful dicta-
torships of the 20th century: Mexico, Brazil, Chile and South Korea. He argues that all of them
employed talented people, at least in the early years of the regime. However, in maturing regimes,
8North and Weingast (1989) (see also Shepsle, 1991 and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, 2005) made the com-
mitment issue central in political science, demonstrating in particular that the interest rate for a constitutionally
restrained monarch (William III) might be lower than for a powerful one (Stuarts from James I to James II). The same
historical context seems to support our message as well: a constrained ruler is more likely to have better ministers.
9Twenty years after Herz’s article was completed, the last of the European dictators that came into power in
1930s, General Franco of Spain, successfully transferred power to a designated successor.
5personalist and institutionalized dictatorships diverged with respect to political competence. In a
personalist dictatorship such as South Korea under Park Chung Hee’s rule, competent people were
driven out of the government with the establishment of the loyalty-based Yushin system in 1971.
Brazil and Mexico, with their institutionalized succession within an authoritarian regime, have had
signiﬁcantly fewer of these problems.
Wintrobe (1990) classiﬁes dictatorial regimes basing on the goal dictators pursue. However,
while investigating the internal structure of dictatorial regimes, this study describes only general
trends and relationships between diﬀerent groups in the society. Wantchekon (2002) investigates the
rise of democratic and dictatorial institutions out of anarchy. He argues that ‘democratization is less
likely when the factions depend heavily on foreign aid or natural resource wealth,’ again raising the
question of connection between factor endowments and institutions. De Long and Shleifer (1993)
ﬁnd that ‘a region ruled by an absolutist prince saw its total urban population shrink by one hundred
thousand people per century relative to a region without absolutist government.’ Providing solid
micro foundations for this general picture is one of the tasks our model seeks to accomplish.
The agency theory of dictatorships need not be applied exclusively to the problem of hiring a
prime minister.10 The main trade-oﬀ t h a tw ei n v e s t i g a t em i g h tn o tb ee n t i r e l yn e wi nt h ec o r p o r a t e
governance literature, where the principal-agent conﬂict was ﬁrst studied. The commitment prob-
lem innate to dictatorships is not so extreme in the corporate world; there are contracts and courts
that enforce them. Still, a top manager of a ﬁrm concerned with the possibility of ‘betrayal’ by a
hired agent might be willing to hire a mediocrity rather than either a high-ability or a low-ability
agent. It is of course never a question of life and death, and calling ‘betrayal’ actions that make
your supervisor feel less happy is a bit of an exaggeration, but still a subordinate who possesses
superior ability to foresee business development might be a danger for anyone who hires her.
Friebel and Raith (2004) (see also Prendergast and Topel, 1996) explore the way this danger
aﬀects the hierarchical structure of a ﬁrm. Glazer (2001) demonstrates that when an agent with
high ability to run a ﬁrm also possesses superior skills in internal rent-seeking, the owner might
be willing to hire a low-ability agent. In contrast, our model highlights that it might not be that
the same person has two complimentary qualities, but the very quality for which the agent is hired
(competence) might be the source of potential disutility to his principal.
Prendergast (1993) (see also Morris, 2003, and Wagner, 2004) demonstrates that if a subordi-
10For the same reason, many ancient and medieval rulers hired foreign bodyguards, who were less able to take power
themselves than the local military. Finer (1997, p. 18) notes that "A ruler [in contrast with the political regime, of
which he is a focial part] might fancy himself more secure when surrounded by a band of foreign mercenaries." In The
Twelve Caesars, Suetonius (110CE, 1979) mentions foreign body-guards protecting Caligula, the foremost example
of an unconstrained ruler fearing betrayal.
6nate’s activity is rewarded based on subjective performance evaluation, high-powered incentives,
while inducing the subordinate to work harder, make her conform to the opinion of the principal.
Though some of the features are similar to those of our model (e.g., that relevant information pos-
sessed by the agent is lost for the principal in equilibrium), the approaches are very diﬀerent. First,
we do not make use of subjective performance evaluation: if the plot fails, the dictator gets all the
relevant information. Second, the vizier has no need to conform to the dictator’s opinion, which he
knows for sure. Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) investigate the trade-oﬀ between competence
of a hired manager and the loyalty of a family member generally lacking that competence. In our
model, loyalty and incompetence are two sides of the same coin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal analysis. Section
3 discusses self-selection of agents, while Section 4 is focused on the dynamic perspective and its
implications. Section 5 studies the two-agent case, which allows us to draw implications for the
case of courtiers rather than a single vizier. Section 6 concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to
the Appendix.
2 The Formal Theory
2.1 The Setup
There are two players in the basic model, a ruler and an agent (vizier).11 The dictator faces a threat
of a plot and has to decide whether to take costly precautionary measures. If the dictator does not
undertake extra measures, the plot succeeds if the enemy is strong (enemy’s type is t = Strong),
and fails if the enemy is weak (t = Weak). Ex ante, the probability that the enemy is strong is
P(t = Strong)=q. If the dictator survives, he receives utility of Y ;i fn o t ,h i su t i l i t yi sn o r m a l i z e d
to 0. If extra measures are undertaken, where the cost to the dictator of such measures is C,
0 <C<Y, the enemy has no chance to take over.
The dictator is unable to judge the seriousness of the plot, so he hires an agent who is more
able to deal with the problem. However, the agent himself is imperfectly informed. Let the agent’s
signal about the enemy’s type be denoted by s.A g e n t so ft y p eθ are characterized by
P(s = Weak| t = Weak)=θ,
11Our basic setup allows us to capture not only a single agent acting as a ﬁrst minister, but also collective advisory
bodies. Evidently, in this case the values of parameters may be diﬀerent, and one may think that the main eﬀect is
that the probabilities of mistakes are less. However, collective bodies are subject to correlated signals and information
cascades, which make the increase in eﬃciency much less signiﬁcant. We consider the case of two agents explicitly
further in the paper.
7while P(s = Strong | t = Strong)=1 .12 The parameter θ reﬂects the degree of competence of the
agent. Thus, the dictator hires a person of type θ and assigns him a policy to act upon. This policy
πD is a mapping from the set of possible signals, {Strong,Weak}, to the set of actions, {H,L},
where H and L stand for high and low eﬀort by the agent, respectively.
An agent hired by the dictator might behave opportunistically, i.e. betray the dictator. We view
betrayal as an action a ∈ {H,L} such that a 6= πD (s). In the case of betrayal, the vizier expects
to receive a reward of R+R if the plot is successful. We assume that R is ﬁxed and parameterizes
the enemy’s strength and, perhaps more importantly, the ability to commit to pay the reward after
the plot, while R is stochastic from the dictator’s viewpoint and is distributed on (0,∞) with c.d.f.
G(x) and p.d.f. g (x) such that g0(x) < 0.
If the agent betrays the dictator but the plot does not succeed, information about the plot is
revealed to the dictator, who punishes the agent with a disutility of F. There is also a premium
W received by the agent in the case where the dictator survives the plot and learns that the agent
did not betray him. (We assume that W>R.) Formally, the agent decides on a ∈ {H,L},i . e .
the level of defense eﬀort (high or low), conditional on the dictator’s order. Thus, he chooses a
strategy from the set of all mappings {(πD,s,R)} −→ {H,L}. The timing of the one-shot game is
as follows.
Timing
1. The dictator chooses an agent characterized by θ from the pool of candidates with competence
ranging from 0 to 1, and prescribes a policy πD to him.
2. The agent receives a noisy signal about the enemy’s strength and learns R, the stochastic
component of his pay-oﬀ if the plot is successful. Based on this information, the agent chooses
the level of eﬀort a ∈ {H,L}.E ﬀectively, the agent decides whether or not to betray the
dictator.
3. The plot unfolds, and the outcome is determined. The dictator receives his pay-oﬀ.T h e
agent is rewarded or punished.
We focus our analysis on the sub-game perfect equilibria of the above game. (In the dynamic
game analyzed in Section 4, the relevant concept is Markov perfect equilibrium.) For simplicity,
we always assume that if the agent is indiﬀerent between betrayal and remaining loyal, he remains
loyal.
12The assumption is made for expositional simplicity: the results go through for any P(s = Strong | t = Strong).
82.2 Agent’s Behavior
To solve for a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we proceed by backward induction, i.e. by studying
the behavior of an agent of a ﬁxed type θ who has received policy prescription πD and information
about the potential reward guaranteed by the dictator’s enemies, R + R.
Proposition 1 (i) If s = Weak, the agent will not betray the dictator. If s = Strong and
πD (Strong)=L, the agent will not betray either. The only case where the agent opts to betray is




P(t = Strong | s = Strong) − FP(t = Weak| s = Strong) >W . (1)
(ii) The probability that an agent of ﬁxed type θ, having received a strong signal, obeys the orders of
the dictator increases with the reward W and the level of punishment for treason F, and decreases
with the ex-ante probability of a serious plot q and his aﬃnity with the opposition R. Moreover,
the same probability of betrayal of a more competent agent can be achieved only by a higher level of
reward/punishment.
The straightforward intuition behind condition (1) is that the agent betrays as long as he knows
that his expected utility from betrayal exceeds that in the case of no betrayal. Both probabilities
are conditional on the agent’s signal s and thus are functions of the agent’s competence θ.T o
calculate them, the agent uses Bayes’ rule:
P(t = Strong | s = Strong)=
q
q +( 1− q)(1− θ)
.
If s = Strong and πD (Strong)=H, then the probability (from the standpoint of an outside
observer, e.g. the dictator) that an agent of type θ does not betray the dictator is
G
µ
W +( 1− θ)
1 − q
q
(W + F) − R
¶
.
This probability increases with W (the premium the agent receives if the dictator survives) and
F (the level of punishment if the agent is caught), and decreases with θ, R,a n dq. Indeed, both
a higher reward for remaining loyal and a higher punishment for the opposite increase the agent’s
incentives to be loyal. A similar intuition applies to R,t h eﬁxed part of the reward for betrayal.
An increase in q leads to an increase in the probability that the enemy is strong, as perceived by
the agent. This, in turn, decreases the agent’s fear of being punished, and makes him more likely
to betray the dictator. Finally, a smarter agent receives a strong signal less frequently than does
a less competent one, but once he has received a strong signal, he is more sure that the enemy is
really strong, which also decreases his fear of punishment.
9The above formula, though straightforward mathematically, deserves additional discussion. A
more competent advisor (one with a high θ) can betray the principal for a higher level of utility
he secures if the dictator survives, since he can aﬀord gambling on a lower level of reward by the
enemy. In other words, the dictator has to pay a smarter agent a higher wage if he wants him
to be as loyal as a less competent one. Therefore, if the dictator is free to choose the level of the
agent’s compensation as it is standard in the theoretical corporate governance literature, he is able
to mitigate the loyalty-vs.-competence trade-oﬀ. However, the dictator has very limited power to
determine the payoﬀs for the agent, both for the case where the agent is to be rewarded and when
he is to be punished. From the ex ante perspective, the reward is not what the dictator promises,
but what the agent believes about the dictator’s promises. A track record of promises being kept is
a thing worth having for any dictator, but once his power is challenged, he falls into a spiral where
his fear of his viziers’ disloyalty makes them more unsafe and, therefore, less loyal.
2.3 Dictator’s Choice
Once we know what each agent does in any state of the world, we can proceed with the dictator’s
problem. In any subgame perfect equilibrium, the dictator assigns πD (Weak)=L, πD (Strong)=
H. Indeed, there is no reason to order the agent to take extra measures if the enemy is weak, as
the agent will necessarily obey the order. On the other hand, if the signal is strong, it is better
if the agent exerts high eﬀort, with the exception of the case of an agent who is so incompetent
that he spares too many resources against a weak enemy wrongly perceived as strong. Since the
dictator can hire an agent of his choice, this never happens in equilibrium.
The dictator’s utility equals
UD(θ)=( 1− q)Y +( q(Y − C) − (1 − θ)(1− q)C)G(·),( 2 )
where (1 − q)Y is his payoﬀ in the case when the enemy is weak, G(·) is the equilibrium probability
that the agent obeys the orders, q(Y − C) is the payoﬀ when the enemy is strong and the defense
is maintained, and (1 − θ)(1− q)C is the cost due to agent’s incompetence (the signal is strong,
the agent obeys, but the enemy is actually weak).
The ﬁrst-order condition for the dictator’s proble mo fc h o o s i n gt h eb e s ta g e n ti sa sf o l l o w s :
∂UD (θ)
∂θ
=( 1− q)CG− (q(Y − C) − (1 − θ)(1− q)C)
1 − q
q
(W + F)G0(·)=0 . (3)
This formula highlights the trade-oﬀ the dictator faces. He wants to balance the beneﬁto f
competence (associated with less money spent on defense if it is unnecessary) and its cost (because
of the possibility of betrayal):




10The left-hand side is the marginal beneﬁt of hiring a more competent agent. A marginal increase
in θ saves C with probability (1 − q)G times this marginal increase, i.e. if the enemy is weak but the
agent receives a strong signal and chooses not to betray. The right-hand side is the expected loss
because of betrayal, taking into account the potential economy of resources if the agent betrays.
In the Appendix, we show that the dictator’s utility function UD (θ) under the standard policy
prescription is single-peaked. Moreover, if θ∗ ∈ [0,1] is the global maximum of the dictator’s utility
function, then the function is strictly concave on [θ∗,1]. The following Proposition summarizes the
above discussion.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in the game, characterized by
θ∗ and R∗. In equilibrium, πD (Strong)=H and πD (Weak)=L, the dictator hires an agent of
type θ∗, and the agent betrays if and only if s = Strong and R + R>R ∗,w h e r e
R∗ = W +( 1− θ)
1 − q
q
(W + F) − R.
Proposition 2 establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium and allows us to study how the
equilibrium choice of the agent’s competence,
θ∗ =a r gm a x
θ∈[0,1]
UD (θ),
depends on the parameters of the model. Without loss of generality, we assume that the maximum
is interior.
Proposition 3 The optimal agent is more able ( θ∗ =a r gm a xUD is high) when either
(i) the dictator is strong (q is low);
(ii) the stakes are low for the dictator (Y is low);
(iii) the aﬃnity between the vizier and the enemy is weak (R is low);
(iv) the measures that have to be taken are more costly (C is high).
Proposition 3 asserts that a less able agent is more likely to be chosen when either the dictator
is weak, the dictator faces a greater threat, the dictator values his power more (plans to leave
a successor), the enemy values power more (when stakes are high), or the dictator can commit
to rewards. (The parameter R is interpreted as the degree to which the plotter can commit
to rewarding the agent if the plot is successful.)13 One can expect that general problems with
commitment in a weakly institutionalized environment mean, on average, fewer rewards (from a
13Machiavelli wrote in "The Prince: "Let him [the vizier] see that he cannot stand alone, so that many honors not
make him desire more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread changes. ...
otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one [the prince] or the other [the vizier]."
11potential challenger), and this induces the advisor to remain loyal to the dictator. On the other
hand, these problems might prevent enemies from overthrowing the dictator, since they are also
unable to make credible promises. When are the plotters able to commit to reward the traitor?
One such situation might be that the agent has his own political base, be it a certain ethnic or
military faction. Thus, a dictator who thinks of bringing a local warlord to the central government
might be interested in increasing the vizier’s loyalty parameter, e.g. by taking a family member
as hostage as was practiced not only in medieval Khorezm, but in 12th century England (Bartlet,
2002).
A striking illustration to the loyalty-vs.-competence trade-oﬀ in a modern dictatorship comes
from archival sources (Petrov and Skorkin, 1999), which exhibit the educational level of top oﬃcers
of NKVD, the Stalin’s praetorians that had been a major political authority during the era of ‘great
purges’ (1934—1941). Literally, NKVD stands for the ‘Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs’, but in practice
it, as the ‘right hand’ of the Communist Party, excercised control of almost all aspects of life in
the USSR (Gregory, 2004). In 1934, 41 percent of top oﬃcers (39 oﬃcers) had less than 7 years of
total schooling, and another 42 percent had less than 10 years. In 1937, the peak year of purges,
these numbers were 37 and 43 percent, respectively.
One occurrence where the above analysis might be relevant is international negotiations and
conﬂicts. Modern dictators rarely negotiate on their own, and the choice of a negotiator involves
the trade-oﬀ we explore: the dictator has to choose a negotiator who is competent enough to bring
agreement on favorable terms, yet too much competence might make the negotiator more sensitive
to personal alternatives provided by the other side. Kydd (2002) argues that a biased mediator
m i g h tb em o r ee ﬀective in conveying a message to a party in negotiations. His argument relies
on the consideration that only a mediator biased towards the recipient of the signal can deliver
credible threats, for he would not forge the threat if there were none. Dictators, however, often treat
suggestions to negotiate as treason, and this may be fatal for subordinates who oﬀer to negotiate.14
With loyal mediocrities being the dictator’s only trusted negotiators, it is not surprising that
negotiations with dictators often lead nowhere (literally, these envoys are often unable to see the
advantages and disadvantages of certain proposals). Saddam Hussein, Hitler, even Napoleon, the
smartest of all dictators, have allowed their capitals — Baghdad, Berlin, and Paris — to be occupied
(and in the extreme case of Hitler, almost fully destroyed) by enemy forces, refusing for months
to have serious negotiations. Here our ﬁndings are consistent with empirical evidence provided by
Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002) and Reiter and Stam (2003) that personalist dictatorships
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Figure 1: Discipline vs. self-selection
are especially prone to open military conﬂicts with democracies (the latter paper also demonstrates
that unconstrained dictators are more likely to challenge a democracy than vice-versa), despite the
fact that personalist dictatorships ﬁght wars poorly (since 1945).
3 Commitment to Punishment and Adverse Selection
Political scientists (e.g., Lewis, 1978, Linz and Chehabi, 1998) have been long aware that dictatorial
rule keeps able people from joining high-level politics. In his memoirs, Albert Speer, once a second-
highest ranked oﬃcial in the Third Reich and a conﬁdant of Hitler, used the words ‘negative
selection’ in his description of Hitler’s court, discussing at length the ignorance and incompetence
of Hitler’s closest subordinates (Speer, 1970).15 This is a particular case of the Akerlof adverse
selection problem: the more severely the dictator punishes those who betrayed him (if he survives
the betrayal), the less the ability of agents applying for the job. Hence, the dictator faces a trade-oﬀ
between high incentives for agents already on the job, which are provided by harsh punishment for
betrayal, and low incentives to encourage potential applicants to apply for the job (see Figure 1).
Indeed, the harsher the punishment for betrayal is, the lower is the expected utility of a competent
advisor. Since it is the agent’s competence that allows him to discriminate among potential plotters,
he would never need to use his competence when the price of betrayal is inﬁnite disutility.
Thus, a dictator has incentives to commit to the optimal punishment, which is less than capital.
15Apparently, Speer does consider himself a counterexample that only proves the rule.
13However, the very nature of dictatorships precludes such commitment.16 Here democracies might
have an advantage, since in democracies it is easier to commit to a mild punishment. In a democracy,
though a punishment for political betrayal might be politically severe, it rarely brings signiﬁcant
personal harm. Clearly, a U.S. President is bound by laws not to kill a cabinet member who
pursues his own presidential ambitions, as was the case with Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase
in Lincoln’s ﬁrst cabinet (e.g., Dudley, 1932), or Attorney General Robert Kennedy in the ﬁrst
cabinet of President Johnson.17 Betraying a brutal dictator such as Saddam Hussein or Fidel
Castro might have been more costly for their ministers.18 Here we suggest a formal description of
this phenomenon.
Proposition 4 (i) Assume R∗g(R∗) is a decreasing function of R∗. Then there exists a level of
punishment F0 such that for all F ≥ F0, the optimal advisor becomes more competent (θ∗(F) is
increasing) with F. However, θ∗(F) < 1 for any F ≥ F0.
(ii) Let θ<1 be the most competent type of advisor available, such that the dictator is still
better oﬀ if he sets the standard policy prescription. For any u>0, there exists some F0 = F0(u)
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(iii) If the reservation utility of an agent of type θ, H(θ), is a continuously diﬀerentiable function
of θ and H0(θ) > 0, then for a suﬃciently high punishment only relatively incompetent advisors
will be self-selected.
The ﬁrst part of the above proposition shows that a higher level of punishment makes a more
competent advisor desirable for the dictator. The second and the third parts assert that with a
higher level of punishment, high-skilled agents gain less from their ability to discriminate potential
plotters. Thus, when able agents face higher opportunity costs than agents with low ability, they
16Since a dictator is not constrained by any external authority, we are concerned with (the absence of) motivation-
ally, as opposed to imperatively, credible commitments (Shepsle, 1991).
17In a non-technical note, Edwards (2001) points to the same loyalty-vs.-competence trade-oﬀ in recent low-level
presidential appointments in the U.S.
18In January 1984, the honorary title of ‘Hero of the Cuban Republic’ was conferred upon Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa in
recognition of his extraordinary contributions to the insurrection against Batista, to the consolidation of the nation’s
defense, and for his service in international missions. In June 1989, MINFAR Minister Raul Castro explained that
Gen. Ochoa ‘was no longer the rebel soldier, the invader of Camilo’s column, the internationalist in Venezuela, the
commander of our troops in Ethiopia.’ In July 1989, the prosecutor’s closing remarks stated that ‘it became evident
that we were confronted with a crime of treason committed against the fatherland, against the people, against his
superiors, and against the very idea of what a revolutionary, a military chief, and a Cuban internationalist ﬁghter
really is.’ In accordance with the ‘sentence dictated by the Special Military Court, Case No. 1 of 1989,’ Gen. Arnaldo
Ochoa and three others faced a ﬁring squad in July 1989. (Alfonso, 1989 and sources cited therein.)
14have fewer incentives to apply for the job when the punishment is high. Part (iii) is proved given
the least restrictive assumption regarding outside opportunities of skilled agents: we assume that
a more skilled agent has better outside prospects than a less able one, but that the diﬀerence (the
slope) might be very small.
The key point in our analysis is that both a democratic leader and a violent dictator have a
limited ability to change F, though the reasons are profoundly diﬀerent. A democratic leader is
bound by laws, and he may even not be the one who determines the size of punishment. It is of
course only natural to expect the level of punishment to be greater in the case of a dictatorial rule.
Consequently, in a democracy, leaders are more prone to political treason, but the pool of applicants
to the agent’s position is likely to be better. Conversely, the bloodiest dictator may feel relatively
safe from betrayal, but the agents he will have to choose from will be extremely incompetent.
One potential counter argument is that the dictator could enter the private labor market and
selectively depress rewards for competence, say, by threatening the family members of potential
agents if the agent refuses to enter his service.19 While this argument certainly does have merit
when applied to a single agent, this approach seems impossible on a large scale.20 Mass emigration
is a most clear indication of unfavorable circumstances for talented people. In the ﬁrst ﬁve years
of the Mussolini regime, one and half million people left Italy (Cannistraro and Rosoli, 1979).
Furthermore, the exile of the political and intellectual elite, which is a tiny fraction of any country’s
population, might not be easily detected by crude statistical data. For example, the departure
of Albert Einstein, Joseph Schumpeter, Thomas Mann, and John von Neumann preceded mass
emigration of the intellectual elite from Europe, but might have had a more profound impact on
the intellectual, and by implication, political life of their home countries. Thus, even for individual
geniuses, providing the incentives to work in a certain political environment might be a complicated
task for the dictator.21
19Gershenson and Grossman (2001) analyze how both cooptation and repression were employed to encourage loyalty
to the Soviet regime.
20Political scientists working on modern dictatorships have long been aware of the problem to ﬁnd a rationale for
either ’random’ terror against population or ’purges’ against loyal members of the regime (see Friedrich and Brzezinski,
1956, p. 150-151 for discussion of the diﬀerence; also, Arendt, 1951). The idea of suppressing the reservation utility
of those who might have choosen to deliberately abstain from politics/government might provide such a rationale.
Another possible policy is restrictions on emigration, a common feature of many authoritarian regimes.
21In the much less frightening circumstances of the last decades of the Soviet rule, talented young Russians chose
mathematics and the natural sciences, generally avoiding politics (and, e.g., political science) as an occupation. One
result, besides ﬂourishing science, was that political positions were occupied by profound mediocrities.
154 Succession
Once an absence of ordered continuance was considered a major drawback of dictatorship as a form
of government (Herz, 1952, Spearman, 1939, Olson, 1993). However, in the ﬁrst half of the 20th
century a number of once-dictatorial regimes survived the death of their founding fathers (e.g.,
Lenin in Russia and Kemal Ataturk in Turkey). Nowadays, the technology of succession appears
to be advanced enough to produce successful transitions in such diverse countries as Syria in 2000,
North Korea in 1994, China in 1989, and Kongo in 2003. Our model predicts that a ruler with a
longer time horizon, e.g., resulting from the assurance of a desired succession, has more incentives
to hire the most able agents. The last years of kings of the largest European monarchies, England,
France, and Russia, executed by revolutionaries, might give additional support to this result. At
the time they lost the crown, all these monarchs had very young heirs incapable of grasping power
if their fathers were dead. And the last years of each of these rulers were marred by the colossal
incompetence of their prime ministers.
To introduce a dynamic perspective, we make the following extension to our basic setup.22 Now
we assume that each dictator is succeeded by another ruler, and that that ruler’s utility may also
be an object of the dictator’s concern. Speciﬁcally, the successor may be either desirable for the
dictator or not. In the ﬁrst case, the successor’s utility is added to that of the dictator with a
discount factor β<1. In the latter case, the dictator does not care about his successor’s utility at
all. We may interpret β as a measure of aﬃnity between the dictator and his successor. It is natural
to think that β is high in the case of monarchy, but low in the case of army colonels succeeding one
another.
Each dictator is characterized by his ability to ensure succession to a desirable heir in the case
he does not survive the plot. The succession is either secure (S) or insecure (I). In the ﬁrst case,
the heir is desirable, and the hier’s type is now either S with probability PS, or I with probability
PI,s oPS + PI =1 . In the latter case, the heir is desirable and secure himself (has type S)
with probability QS, and desirable and insecure (heir’s type is I) with probability QI. However,
QS +QI < 1, so there is a non-trivial chance that the successor will not be desired. His type in this
case is irrelevant from the dictator’s standpoint. If the dictator wins, he is able to ensure that the
successor is desired and has type S. One may rationalize this case as the one where the dictator
22Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) introduced a broad class of dynamic models for comparative political economy.
(See also Acemoglu, 2003, Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier, 2004, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004, and an earlier
paper of Grossman and Noh, 1990). Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000), Overland, Simmons, and Spagat (2000), and
Restrepo and Spagat (2001) focus on economic consequences of dictatorships in a dynamic perspective. Galliego and
Pitchik (2004) analyze dynamics of coup d’etats with exogenous quality of dictators’ court.
16succeeds himself.
For each dictator, the probability that the dictator loses equals q(1 − G),w h e r eG is the
probability that the agent obeys even having received a strong signal. Denote
Y ∗ =( 1− q)Y +( q(Y − C) − (1 − θ)(1− q)C)G.
The agent is concerned with his one-period utility (for the sake of simplicity, he serves the dictator
for one period only). The dictator faces the following utility maximization problems.
US =m a x
θ
(Y ∗ + β (1 − q(1 − G))US + βq(1 − G)(PSUS + PIUI)).
UI =m a x
θ
(Y ∗ + β (1 − q(1 − G))US + βq(1 − G)(QSUS + QIUI)).
We search for Markov perfect equilibria in this game.
Proposition 5 (i) There exists a unique perfect Markov equilibrium. In this equilibrium, US >U I,
and the competence of the agent is less in state I than in the state S.
(ii) For smaller β, US, UI and US −UI are smaller. Consequently, the competence of the agent
is higher if the dictator cares less about his successors.
Part (i) shows that a less sure succession leads to less competent agents. This result may be used
to explain the poor governance of monarchs whose immediate heirs are small children, or have other
contenders for the throne (i.e., relatives they do not like). Part (ii) demonstrates that less desired
succession leads to better agents. It may also help to explain the diﬀerence between ‘party-machine’
dictatorships such as Mexico in 1940—90, where members of a non-representative selectorate suc-
ceed each other as leaders of the country, but have neither desire nor possibility to pass this post to
their children, and monarchies, whose rulers have such desire and possibility. The model predicts
that a personalist dictatorship is less likely to witness competent advisors than an institutionalized
dictatorship. Domínguez (2002) reaﬃrms that ‘the most successful authoritarian regimes, namely,
historical bureaucratic empires, had means of succession from one monarch to the next and fea-
tured bureaucratic organizations for the sharing and exercise of power.’ Not coincidentally, Mexico,
probably the most successful of 20th century dictatorships, had a well-institutionalized procedure
for succession for almost six decades.
175 Courtiers23
Appointing a council instead of a single advisor, the dictator might enjoy two kinds of beneﬁts.
First, with a council, more information can be aggregated, especially if members’ signals are uncor-
related. Second, the members of the council face a coordination problem with respect to treason,
one which dictators usually took advantage of. While the latter advantage was already well un-
derstood by Machiavelli, the former is much less so. We allow for the possibility of a second agent
in the model in order to investigate when the dictator is better suited to enjoy the information
aggregation advantages of a court.
Assume that the dictator has to hire two agents of type θ.24 We consider the following modiﬁ-
cation of our basic setup. Suppose that each agent receives the same (correct!) information about
potential reward R + R, but the signals s1 and s2 are independent conditional on t. (This implies
that information can indeed be aggregated.) Both agents can exert either high or low eﬀort; they
choose their actions simultaneously and independently. As before, the dictator is safe if the enemy
is weak. If the enemy is strong, the dictator is absolutely secure if both agents have chosen high
defense, and absolutely insecure if neither has. If only one agent has exerted high eﬀort and the
enemy is strong, the enemy wins with probability α 6=0 . Each half of defense costs C
2 .A s f o r
the agents, they are rewarded or punished independently, i.e. participation of one agent in a coup
does not undermine the potential beneﬁts of another. Finally, assume for simplicity that policy
prescription is ﬁxed at πD (Strong)=H, πD (Weak)=L for both agents.25
As before, we proceed with backward induction. It is easy to establish that if agent i receives
signal si = Weak, then he obeys the dictator (and chooses the low defense level). The intuition is
practically the same: the agent knows that whatever his colleague does, the dictator will survive,
and this makes him willing to avoid punishment.
Now consider the case where si = Strong. Having received such a signal, the agent cares
whether the enemy is strong. Bayes’ formula yields
P(t = Strong | si = Strong)=
q
q +( 1− θi)(1− q)
.
23Our model can be most directly applied to ‘the palace’ regimes in Finer’s typology of governments (Finer, 1997,
p. 38). Historical examples include ancient kingdoms and empires such as Byzantine, Roman, Persian, and Chinese,
a n da b s o l u t i s tE u r o p e a nm o n a r c h i e so f1 7 t ha n d1 8 t hc e n t u r i e s .S t i l l ,c o u r t sp l a y e de n o r m o u sr o l ee v e ni nm o d e r n
fascist dictatorships such as that of Hitler (Speer, 1972) and Stalin (Monteﬁore, 2003).
24Alternatively, we could consider the case where agents may have distinct types θ1 and θ2. However, this would
at some point lead to unnecessary complications that would obscure the coordination eﬀect we want to depict.
25We assume this in particular to avoid the potential situation where one half of defense is almost suﬃcient to
protect the dictator, so that he tells one agent to choose low defense all the time in order to save resources.
18If the enemy is strong, he knows that his colleague has also received s−i = Strong,i . e .
P(s−i = Strong | t = Strong, si = Strong)=1 .
If, however, the enemy is weak, agent i does not care about his colleague’s signal, because he knows
that in that case he would be punished anyway if he attempts to betray the dictator.
To summarize, agent i knows that if the enemy is strong, his fellow agent also receives signal
s−i = Strong. Moreover, he knows what information about R his colleague received, since they
both receive correct information. We want to ﬁnd out agent i’s best reaction to his colleague’s
strategy. Denote by di (R) the level of defense that agent i chooses if his signal is strong and the
potential reward equals R. Function di is assumed to be measurable, and its value set is {H,L}.
We search for the equilibrium level of di.
Suppose that agent i has received a strong signal and that the potential reward equals R.I f
d−i (R)=L, i.e. another agent will betray the dictator if his signal is also strong, then the agent
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Similarly, if d−i (R)=H, i.e. another agent will not betray for such R, then the agent will betray
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− F − R ≡ RH.
This result is quite intuitive. The agent has stronger incentives to betray the dictator if the potential
reward is high. Note that RL <R H, which simply means that the threshold reward is lower if
another agent chooses to betray.
We can now summarize these results and ﬁnd agent i’s best reaction to another agent’s strategy





H, R ≤ RL;
d−i, RL <R≤ RH;
L, RH <R .
19Having this result, we can prove the following proposition about pure strategy equilibria in the
s u b g a m ep l a y e db ya g e n t s .T h ed i ﬀerence between these equilibria is in the set of R’s between RL
and RH where agents betray. All equilibria are symmetric.
Proposition 6 There exist an inﬁnite number of equilibria. In any of them, agents who received
a weak signal obey the dictator. If agent i receives a strong signal, his behavior is given by function
di, such that di (R)=H if R ≤ RL, di (R)=L if RH <R ,a n df o rR’s such that RL <R≤ RH,
d1 (R)=d2 (R).
To proceed further, we reﬁne equilibria to study those that appear to be most reasonable.
Namely, we conﬁne ourselves to monotonic equilibria, i.e. those where there exists some ˜ R ∈
[RL,R H] such that di (R)=H ⇐⇒ R ≤ ˜ R. Our rationale is that in the one-agent setup, the agent
was more likely to betray for larger R’s. We consider it reasonable to retain this property in the
two-agent case. In that case, ˜ R parameterizes all such equilibria.
It is easy to see that both agents are better oﬀ if they play an equilibrium given by a smaller
˜ R. However, it is not always possible for people to negotiate on the equilibrium they will play. Let
τ be such that ˜ R = τRL +( 1− τ)RH.W eb e l i e v et h a tτ reﬂects trust between the agents. The
dictator’s utility if agents play an equilibrium characterized by ˜ R is given by the following formula:
U
˜ R





This helps us establish the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (i) Suppose that the dictator has to hire two agents of a ﬁxed type θ.H e w o u l d
prefer to hire those whose degree of trust τ is as small as possible.
(ii) For every τ, there exists a unique equilibrium in the game, which is characterized by θτ,t h e
dictator’s optimal choice. Let θ∗ be the dictator’s choice in the one-agent setup. Then, if τ =1 ,
θτ ≤ θ∗, i.e. the concordance between agents leads to less competent advisors as compared to the
case of one agent. Moreover, θτ is decreasing as a function of τ, provided that τ is close to 1.
This fact may be interpreted as an implementation of ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics. Actually, what
the dictator wants is lack of trust between his subordinates, which would prevent coordinated
betrayal. The dictator may be better oﬀ if he has an advisor who is unlikely to cooperate with other
ones. For instance, Saddam Hussein might have kept Tarik Aziz, a Christian in a predominantly
Sunni government, as his primary negotiator with foreign countries for this very reason. Another
example of keeping a vizier who is opposing the rest of the autocrat’s associates is Mazarin, whose
Italian origin prevented him from cooperating with French nobles in the time of the Fronde.
20In part (ii) of Proposition 7 we focus on equilibria of the whole game, namely, on the dictator’s
choice of θ. The fact that agents with diﬀerent θ m a yp l a yd i ﬀerent equilibria in the subgame makes
this problem too complex. To proceed, we assume that agents are committed to a certain level of
trust τ, and the dictator chooses θ taking this level of trust as given. In other words, apparently
good relations between the agents may force the dictator to hire less competent advisors. Also,
if the dictator is able to hire advisors who can hardly deal with each other, he can aﬀord more
competent ones.
We stress that our emphasis is not on the coordination problem per se. The observation that
the success of a plot against a dictator is conditional upon the courtiers’ ability to coordinate on
treason is well-established in the political science literature (e.g., see Kydd, 2004, for a formal
treatment; O’Flaherty, 1991, presents a model where plotters have to incur a ‘communication’ cost
up front). We show that the trust between advisors prevents the dictator from enjoying the fruits
of information aggregation, which is the single most important reason to have a council at all. This
proposition may also help to explain the observation that many dictators often get rid of early
supporters. Early supporters might have had a long history of working with each other, and if they
assisted the dictator in coming to power, they typically have a history of a ﬁght for a common
cause. This might have increased the level of trust between them, thus making them dangerous to
the dictator.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In a recent inquiry into the dynamic nature of dictatorships, Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier
(2004) suggest that ‘while the academic study of strongly-institutionalized polities is well advanced,
there are few studies, and less of a consensus, on the nature of weakly-institutionalized polities.’
Poor governance in, and the degeneration of, mature dictatorships allow for a number of plausible
explanations. These include the greediness and selﬁshness of the dictator, as well as his personal
incompetence and inability to listen and follow advice. We use the formal apparatus of economic
theory to investigate agency problems in dictatorships as compared to democracies. We demon-
strate that it is the unwillingness and inability of the dictator, fearful of opportunistic behavior
b yt h ea g e n ta n di nt h ew o r s tc a s eh i so rh e rb e t r a y al, to surround himself with competent asso-
ciates that causes the poor performance of dictatorships in the long run. Since the deﬁnition of
competence we use is, in a sense, all-encompassing, the resulting incompetence will sooner or later
have an adverse eﬀect on the policies carried out and consequently on economic performance and
social welfare. The most profound eﬀect to be felt in “control regimes”, which rely on government
21intervention as the primary mechanism of resource allocation.26
There is a strand in the literature on dictatorships that argues that the dictators have an
advantage in choosing the most able man for government positions, while in democracies the ﬁrst-
best choice may be impossible (e.g., de Toquiville, 2000, originally published in 1831). Though
there is a certain merit to this point, the circumstances in which a dictator has this advantage are
limited. One such situation appears when a new dictator emerges after years of political stagnation
or political turmoil, bringing a whole class of politically young and able people with him. However,
though emergence of new faces in politics or government may coincide with the accession of a
dictator, it might be the same political wave that removed the former elite that both made a
new dictator possible and extended the opportunities of other talented individuals. One example
might be Napoleon’s famous marshals, a group of brilliant military oﬃcers of plebeian origin who
pursued their army careers to a point previously reserved to people of noble origin only. Though
their military glory came in full under Napoleon’s command in the early 1800s, it was the French
revolution of the earlier decade that made a dramatic break in their careers possible.27
Probably the most prominent modern theory highlighting the advantages of dictatorship is
Mancur Olson’s ‘stationary bandit’ paradigm (Olson, 1993).28 However, as Wintrobe (2000) rightly
observes, ‘the problem with Olson’s analysis is that, comparing dictatorships, the worst regimes
in human history appear to be precisely those such as Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, or Cambodia
which appear to have been the most encompassing.’ The agency theory of dictatorships suggests
an explanation why, despite a large encompassing interest, even a benevolent dictator may fail
to implement a socially desirable policy. The ‘loyalty-vs.-competence’ trade-oﬀ,w h i c hi sm u c h
more severe when commitment mechanisms are weak, is in a sense an indispensable feature of any
26The economic performance of dictatorships is a recurring topic for empirical research (e.g., see Epstein et al.,
2004, and Przeworski et al., 2000, for opposing views; see also Persson, 2002). While acknowledging that the emerging
consensus in recent empirical studies does emphasize the advantages of democracy, Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that
dictatorial rule might be conductive for economic growth. However, the point of reference seems to be elusive: in the
underdeveloped world, which provides most examples of rapid growth under dictatorship, democracy is often not a
plausible option at all. Our theory does not necessarily imply that a dictatorship, if an inferior form of government,
will necessarily vanish.
27Supporting our basic story, Napoleon’s Marshal Jean-Batist Bernadotte — in Napoleon’s opinion, one of the two
marshals with a war talent equal to that of the Emperor himself — left Napoleon not out of fear of ultimate defeat,
but at the zenith of Napoleon’s power in 1811. The other military genius, General Moreau, left Napoleon — via
participation in an unsuccessful plot — even earlier, in 1803.
28The idea of a stationary bandit can of course be traced back to Hobbes, who appraised monarchy as a system
w h e r ep u b l i ca ﬀairs are run perfectly because they are actually private. A formal model can be found, e.g., in
McGuire and Olson (1996). Epstein and Rosendorﬀ (2004) analyze what might prevent an autorcat from pursuing a
growt-enhancing policy.
22dictatorship. Even if a dictator reads this paper, and understands the logic, it gives no help to him
if he is insistent on keeping his power unrestricted. Until he opts for a sustainable delegation of
power to other political institutions, he will have no opportunity to improve the quality of ministers.
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27Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .(i) If s = Weak,t h e nt = Weak, hence dictator will survive for sure.
He will also survive if s = Strong, but πD (S)=L and the agent betrays. Therefore, in these cases
the agent will obey in order to avoid punishment. If, however, s = Weak, but πD (S)=H,t h e n
the agent has the following options. If he obeys and builds a high defense, he will get W for sure.
If he betrays the dictator, he gets R + R if t = Strong and −F if t = Weak. So, in this case he
betrays the dictator if and only if (1) holds.
(ii) Bayes’ formula yields P(t = Strong | s = Strong)=
q
q+(1−θ)(1−q).F r o m(1) we get
P
µ
R ≤ W +( 1− θ)
1 − q
q




W +( 1− θ)
1 − q
q
(W + F) − R
¶
.
The last expression increases with W, F and decreases with θ,q,R. To keep this probability the
same if θ increases, the dictator needs a larger W or F. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . First, we consider the dictator’s choice. If s = W, then the agent
will obey, and it is best for the dictator to choose πD (W)=L.I f πD (W)=πD (S)=L,t h e n
the dictator’s expected utility equals (1 − q)Y , since no defense will ever be built. However, the
dictator will be better oﬀ if he chooses πD (W)=L, πD (S)=H and θ =1 ,b e c a u s ei nt h a tc a s ea
strong defense will be built with non-zero probability if and only if t = S. This completes the ﬁrst
part of the proof.
Now let us prove that UD (θ) has no interior minima. For brevity, denote X ≡ q(Y − C) −
(1 − θ)(1− q)C.D i ﬀerentiate (3) with respect to θ:
∂2UD (θ)
∂θ2 = −2(1− q)C
1 − q
q







From (3) we conclude that if
∂UD(θ)
∂θ ≤ 0, which is of course true at a local interior minimum, so
X>0, and thus (4) implies
∂2UD(θ)
∂θ2 < 0,s i n c eG00 < 0. Evidently, this violates the necessary
second-order condition. Therefore, this function has exactly one local maximum, i.e. it is single-
peaked. Also note that if θ∗ is a local maximum of UD (θ) which does not equal 1,t h e n
∂UD(θ)
∂θ ≤ 0,
and hence X>0 at θ ∈ [θ∗,1],s i n c eX increases with θ∗.T h i si m p l i e s
∂2UD(θ)
∂θ2 < 0 on [θ∗,1].W e
conclude that πD is determined uniquely, and θ∗ is also unique. This completes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t o n3 .We are interested in the case of an interior maximum only (to be precise,
in maxima where
∂UD(θ)
∂θ =0 ). Diﬀerentiating the implicit function θ∗ = θ∗ (x),w h e r ex is any of




θ=θ∗ > 0. Compute






















q2 (W + F)
µ








= −(1 − q)(W + F)G0 < 0
∂2UD (θ)
∂θ∂R
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ=θ∗
= −(1 − q)CG0 − X
1 − q
q
(W + F)G00 < 0
∂2UD (θ)
∂θ∂C
=( 1− q)G +( q +( 1− θ)(1− q))
1 − q
q
(W + F)G0 > 0.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Compute the following cross-derivative.
∂2UD (θ)
∂θ∂F










If (1 − q)(1− θ)C−X ≥ 0,t h e n
∂2UD(θ)
∂θ∂F is positive for obvious reasons. Otherwise, note that since



















The expression in brackets is negative for a large F since it is linear with respect to F.T h e r e f o r e ,
∂2UD(θ)














This expression is linear in F and is decreasing. Hence, it is negative for a suﬃciently large F.








⎠ +( 1− θ)(1− q)(WG− F (1 − G)) + θ(1 − q)W.
Its derivative with respect to θ equals
∂UA (θ)
∂θ
=( 1− q)(W + F)(1− G).




both UA (θ) and
∂UA(θ)
∂θ uniformly converge to zero as F →∞ .
Since
∂H(θ)




∂θ for large F.
Therefore, the set of agents for whom UA (θ) ≥ H (θ) is a certain segment [0,θ0] (or empty set). In
other words, for large F only relatively incompetent agents are selected. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .(i) Optimal trajectory can be written as
US =m a x
θ
f (US,U I), UI =m a x
θ
g (US,U I).
29The right-hand side deﬁnes a mapping from the plane (US,U I) to itself. Let us prove that it
is contracting in metric C∞, where the distance is the maximum of distances between similar
coordinates. Let τ =
1+β
2 . We show that the distance between images does not exceed τ times













. Evidently, Lagrange’s formula yields




∂UI (·)∆UI. Note that partial derivatives are computed at






and (US,U I). Hence, by contracting














= β ((1 − q(1 − G)) + q(1 − G)PS),
∂f
∂UI




= βq(1 − G)PI.









f (US,U I) <Kmax(∆US,∆UI) ≤ τ max(∆US,∆UI),
where K = β ((1 − q(1 − G)) + q(1 − G)PS)+βq(1 − G)PI +
1−β
2 . In a small vicinity, partial






, and all errors are dominated by the term
1−β
2 Similarly,
∆maxθ g(US,U I) <τmax(∆US,∆UI). Hence, the same holds for the maximum of the increments.
Now consider two arbitrary points on the plane and connect them with a segment. Each point
on the segment yields a vicinity with the deﬁned property (it contracts to its center). Taking a
ﬁnite subset of these vicinities that covers the segment, we can add the inequalities obtained to get
that ∆maxθ g(US,U I) <τmax(∆US,∆UI) holds for any points. This proves that the mapping is
contracting, and the equations have a unique solution (US,U I).
Note that any iteration process converges to (US,U I). The image of a point with positive
coordinates preserves that property. Therefore US and UI are at least non-negative. Since neither
maxθ f (US,U I) nor maxθ g (US,U I) may equal zero if US and UI are nonnegative, US and UI are
positive. Furthermore, the double inequality US ≥ UI ≥ 0 is also preserved, because if g reaches its
maximum at θ0, then the value of f at θ0 is not less than that of g, and this holds for the maximum
of f. US = UI may not be the case, hence, US >U I.T h ec o e ﬃcients at G for the two states are
X +βq(1 − PS)(US − UI) and X +βq((1 − QS)(US − UI)+( 1− QS − QI)UI), respectively, and
the latter is obviously greater. Therefore, θ is not less in the state S than in the state I.






,w h e r eU0
S >U 0
I , is the stable point. We need to study
the signs of the derivatives dUS
∂β ,dUI
∂β and dUS−dUI
∂β at point β0. Just as before, we do not need to
30diﬀerentiate with respect to θ. Hence, the signs are the same as in the case of the mapping
U1
S = f (US,U I),U 1
I = g(US,U I),
where θ is ﬁxed. This mapping is linear. Obviously, if U0




Suppose that β<β 0. To prove that this implication still holds, we notice that,
U1
S − U1
I = βq(1 − G)((PS − QS)US +( PI − QI)UI)
= βq(1 − G)((PS − QS)(US − UI)+( PS − QS + PI − QI)UI).
Since PS − QS + PI − QI > 0, the middle inequality is also preserved, and for the other two
the statement is evident. Therefore, for β, the stable point lies in the area where US <U 0
S and
US −UI <U 0
S −U0
I (it is easy to see that β has a non-trivial eﬀect on these values and inequalities
are strict). Also, the inequality U0
I >U I is preserved, and thus the second coordinate of the stable
point also decreases. This leads to a higher competence of agents if β is smaller (in both cases),
since coeﬃcients at G become less in both states. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6. Obviously, if s = Weak,t h e nt = Weak, and thus the agent obeys.
Now suppose that agent i received si = Strong. From the best response formula it is easy to
see that if R ≤ RL, then obeying the dictator is best for the agent regardless of his counterpart’s
strategy. Similarly, if R>R H, it is optimal for him to betray the dictator. If RL <R≤ RH,i ti s
optimal to behave exactly the same way as the other agent does. Evidently, any functions d1 and
d2 satisfying these properties constitute a Nash equilibrium. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .(i) The dictator’s utility equals
U
˜ R





which is increasing with ˜ R, which is in turn decreasing with τ. Consequently, for any ﬁxed θ the
dictator will choose a pair of agents with as little τ as possible.
(ii) As in the proof of proposition 2, we can diﬀerentiate U
˜ R
D(θ),w h e r e ˜ R is a function of both
θ and τ, twice to see that it is single-peaked. Therefore, the equilibrium is unique. Notice that for
τ =1 , U
˜ R










the advisors chosen by the dictator are worse if the trust between them is perfect than in the case




∂θ∂τ < 0. Consequently, the quality of agents
optimal for the dictator deteriorates as trust between them increases.¥
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